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Abstract Epicurus was a philosopher who lived in Greece in the 3rd century B.C.
Like his contemporaries, he was much concerned with the question of how to live a
good life. In his view the Chief Good is to decrease pain and increase pleasure. Though
Epicurus is reputed for advocating the pursuit of refined sensorial pleasures, he rec-
ognized the need for deferring gratification or enduring pain. He advised his followers
to lead a modest and contemplative life in friendly communities. His advice can be
characterized as ‘serene hedonism’. This paper explains that position and considers its
applicability for the present day. It concludes that Epicureanism was quite accurate in
describing the conditions of happiness and that he offered valuable guidelines in
dealing with hardship and difficult emotional content. His ideas that happiness is the
same as the absence of pain and that one should withdraw from society are less for-
tunate. It made him assume that happiness automatically follows if one is in the right
state of mind, and that there is no need to actively seek interaction with the environ-
ment for the betterment of the circumstances of life. However, Epicurus’ advice might
have been a good option for his contemporaries given the societal turmoil in his times.
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1 Introduction
More than 2000 years ago, in the Greek world, many philosophers occupied them-
selves with the question, What makes our lives happy? Most of these antique phi-
losophies, like the systems of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoa, not only produced theory
on this subject, but also promised happiness to those who were willing to accept their
viewpoints (Algra, 1998a, pp. 18–19.) Among these great philosophical systems
Epicurus’ philosophy stands out because it is a view that identifies happiness with
pleasure and is the one among the ancient versions of hedonism that is best known
and to which attention is still paid.
Epicurus’ philosophy, formulated in the third century B.C., gave its followers the
prospect of personal happiness and took almost religious proportions; the adherents
lived in small communities and the founder of this school was worshipped as a deity.
His life was considered exemplary. There are some indications that Epicurus was
successful in living his own philosophy, and he gave clear, understandable advice on
how to achieve personal happiness. Moreover, he claimed to have founded his
philosophy on empirical facts. His philosophy about the good life brought Epicurus
fame that has lasted till the present day. Epicureanism is a name for a specific
lifestyle that seeks refined sensual pleasure, although this stance does not follow
logically from the philosophy. Epicurus warned explicitly against the pursuit of
luxury. Indulgence would increase desires and make a person dependent on the
whims of fortune.
Epicurus’ thoughts about happiness are often reviewed from a philosophical
standpoint (see for a good example Annas, 1993), but in this paper we ask the more
practical question whether his advice for leading a happy life still deserves to be
followed. To that end we will first present a description of Epicurus’ life and his
recommendations. Next we will compare his advice with the present day conditions
for happiness as observed in modern empirical research. Note that we do not seek
philosophical exegesis of Epicurus’ ideas.
2 Epicurus
2.1 His time
Epicurus formulated his happiness advice during the Hellenistic period in Greek
history that runs from 323 B.C., the year of the death of Alexander the Great until
the establishment of the Roman Empire in 31 B.C. (Tarn, 1952). In this era many
new philosophies were formulated and gained popularity; it seems that the philos-
ophies in vogue at the end of the fourth century B.C., the schools of Plato and
Aristotle, could no longer provide reasonable answers for life in the changing times
that resulted from the politics and conquests of Alexander the Great. The new so-
called Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism, Skepticism and Epicureanism, are some-
times called the products of the new world Alexander the Great had made, and can
be regarded as attempts to come to terms with the changing social and political
circumstances (Long, 1986; Tarn, 1952). The Greeks came into contact with new
philosophies, religions and cultures, and transplanted the social institutions of the
Greek mainland to Asia and Egypt (Long, 1986).
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The sheer size of the Greek empire caused the importance of the city-state to
decline. People were travelling around; citizenship was no longer bound to one city;
and the city-state was no longer the way to organize society. The Greeks started to
think about people as individuals living in a cosmopolitan universe of which Greece
formed only a part (Jones, 1989). The old loyalty to the Greek race, the city-state,
and its Olympic Gods didn’t seem that important anymore. Commitment to civic
and political activity could no longer compete with the more immediate claims of
private life (Jones, 1989; Russell, 1990). The Greek citizens became alienated from
the affairs of their own city.
The changes were accompanied by a general feeling of insignificance and inse-
curity. The world had become unpredictable and bewildering for many Greeks. The
years after Alexander’s death were characterized by political instability, wars and
dynastic struggles (Russell, 1990; Tarn, 1952). This situation added to the impulse to
turn away from the outer world and seek security and identity in the sphere of
private relationships (Jones, 1989). The Hellenistic philosophies took various posi-
tions in an effort to deal with these changing times. Stoicism addressed the more
highly educated and aristocratic citizens with its focus on public life. Epicurus’
philosophy appealed mostly to the fearful and oppressed citizens, the ones that
didn’t want the new world (Tarn, 1952). It promised a way out of the turmoil into a
more quiet and safe life.
2.2 Personal history
Epicurus was born on the island of Samos in 341 B.C. as the son of Neocles and
Chairestrate. Because he was born in a colony of Athens he was an Athenian citizen
and at the age of 18 he went to Athens to fulfil his military obligations. In 321 he
joined his parents in Colophon on the west coast of Asia Minor. Then he stayed a
while in Mytilene on Lesbos and in Lampsacus. The details of Epicurus’ life in the
period 320–310 are not well known, nor is it entirely clear where and by whom
Epicurus was educated. He claimed to be self-taught, although tradition has it that
he was schooled in the systems of Plato and Democritus (Laertius, 1994, pp. 3–4).
Between 307 and 305 Epicurus settled again in Athens. He purchased a house and
a large walled Garden where he taught and where he and a group of followers
formed a close community. His school became known by the name of the Garden––
Keˆpos. In antiquity the Garden was famous for its closed character, the enormous
loyalty to Epicurus and the close friendships between the members. Epicurus stayed
in Athens until he died in 271 at the age of 72. Although his writings were volu-
minous, there are only fragments left (Algra, 1998b, pp. 9–11).
After his death, Epicureanism continued to flourish as a philosophical movement.
Communities of Epicureans sprang up throughout the Hellenistic world, a cult rose
around the person Epicurus and celebrations were held in his memory. Epicurean-
ism went into decline with the rise of Christianity and it was not until the Renais-
sance that serious interest in Epicureanism was revived.
2.3 Philosophy
Epicurus followed the popular division of philosophy into three parts: physics, logic
and ethics. He confined logic to epistemology––kanoˆnika––which enables us to
distinguish true from false propositions. The primary criterion of truth comes from
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the senses; we can gain knowledge through the senses and we can trust the senses
when properly used (Epicurus, 1994, p. 38). Feelings––paˆthe––also provide criteria
for the truth; they serve as criteria for values. Epicurus also identifies prolepsis as a
criterion. The prolepsis of a thing is an instinctively acquired generic grasp of its
nature and includes those of god, human beings and body.
Epicurus’ physics is based on his epistemology: on the indisputable evidence from
the sense-experiences and the natural generic conceptions. His physics is material-
istic and mechanistic (Algra, 1998a, p. 26). He appropriated much of the mechanics
of his predecessor, the atomist Democritus, but introduced an element of sponta-
neity. Epicurus believed that the basic constituents of the world were atoms moving
in the void and that ordinary objects are conglomerations of these atoms. The
properties of macroscopic bodies and all the events we see occurring can be
explained in terms of the coalitions, rebounding, and entanglements of atoms
(Epicurus, 1994, pp. 42–44).
Epicurus’ thoughts about ethics are based on his view of physics and logic. In the
domain of ethics we should trust our feelings of pleasure and pain. Pleasure––
heˆdoneˆ––is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable and should be regarded as the
main criterion for all actions. It is given by human nature that all our actions aim at
pleasure and try to avoid displeasure. Epicurus argues that the behaviour of the
newborn confirms this theory (Epicurus, 1994, p. 128). Epicurus outlines the view
that pleasure and pain are jointly exhaustive: the absence of pain is itself pleasure.
This implies that there is no intermediate state: For we are in need of pleasure only
when we are in pain and when we are not in pain then we no longer need pleasure.
And this is why we say that pleasure is the starting point and goal of living happily.
For we recognized this as our first innate good, and this is our starting point for every
choice and avoidance and we come to this by judging every good by the criterion of
feeling (Epicurus, 1994, pp. 128–129).
The freedom from pain, which is, as we have seen, in itself a pleasant state,
consists in the lack of pain in the body––aponia––and the non-disturbance of the
soul, a state Epicurus called the tranquillity of the mind––ataraxia––(Epicurus, 1994,
p. 131). This state is also called static pleasure, because it is thought to arise from the
stable atomic structure of our souls. The kinetic pleasures are thought to be less
important, because they rely on the actual motion of the atoms and are temporary.
This idea made Epicurus emphasize ‘untroubledness’ over the less important posi-
tive pleasures, although this static state could be achieved or varied by short-term––
kinetic––pleasures of stimulation. The kinetic pleasures have a bodily and a mental
version. Mental pleasures can also consist in reliving past kinetic pleasures or
anticipating future ones and can outweigh present pains.
Epicurus insists that one should trust one’s feelings. This, however, does not imply
that the accumulation of new instant pleasures increases happiness beyond what is
achieved when all pain has gone (Epicurus, 1994, p. xviii). Thus the pursuit of luxury
does not increase pleasure. What it can do is enlarge your desires, make you run the
risk of becoming dependent on them and thus make you vulnerable to the whims of
fortune. This implies that one sometimes has to pass up some pleasures in order to
get a greater pleasure, and that many pains are better than some pleasures if a
greater pleasure follows by enduring those pains (Epicurus, 1994, p. 129). To max-
imize pleasure one therefore has to calculate the relative roles of bodily and mental,
static and kinetic pleasures. Epicurus was an ‘unimpeachable ascetic who taught that
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‘‘genuine pleasure’’ was not ‘‘the pleasure of profligates,’’ but rather the simple
satisfaction of a mind and body at peace’ (McMahon, 2004, p. 11).
3 Epicurus’ advice
Epicurus does not see the above-mentioned three parts of philosophy––logic, physics
and ethics––as equally important. He subordinates logic to physics and physics to
ethics. The purpose of knowledge is pragmatic and solely meant to free you from
fears and mental uncertainty. Epicurus’ philosophy aims at making life happy and
promises happiness to anyone who embraces his viewpoint.
Let no one delay the study of philosophy while young nor become weary of it
when old. For no one is either too young or too old for the health of the soul. He who
says either that the time for philosophy had not yet come or that it has passed is like
someone who says that the time for happiness has not yet come or that it has passed.
Therefore both young and old must philosophise, the latter so that although old he
may stay young in good things owing to gratitude for what has occurred, the former
so that although young he too may be like an old man owing to his lack of fear or
what is to come. Therefore, one must practise the things which produce happiness,
since if that is present we have everything and if it is absent we do everything in
order to have it. (Epicurus, 1994, p. 122).
3.1 Four basic truths
Epicurus’ happiness philosophy is hedonistic in the sense that he equates the old
Greek concept of happiness––eudaimonia––with pleasure––heˆdone. Pleasure is the
starting-point and the goal of living happily (Epicurus, 1994, p. 128). Life is plea-
surable when the mind is free from fears and the body is content with natural
satisfactions. You can achieve this state of happiness if you accept the four basic
truths of Epicureanism, the so-called ‘four-part cure’ (Philodemus of Gardara, cited
in Epicurus (1994, p. vii)):
1. Don’t fear the gods
2. Don’t worry about death
3. What is good is easy to get
4. What is terrible is easy to endure
3.1.1 Don’t fear the gods
Epicurus claims that the gods exist because we have clear knowledge of them.1 They
are happy and immortal, indestructible and blessed animals (Epicurus, 1994, p. 123).
The gods are in a state of bliss, and are only occupied with the continuance of their
own happiness. They do not have any needs, are invulnerable to any harm and do
not concern themselves with the human world. The gods therefore have no influence
over our lives and this is why we don’t have to fear them.
1 In Epicurus’ view there is a natural conception (prolepsis) of god, a conception that is shared by all
human beings.
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This leaves Epicurus and us with the question how there can be any order if the
gods are unconcerned about human affairs. The physical reality lacks immanent
order. It is up to us to find the limitations that human nature imposes on us and to
create our own order. We have to make arrangements to manage the external
threats as well as possible (Hutchinson, 1994, p. x). This means that there is no need
to ask favours from the gods, because we humans are fully able to supply things for
ourselves (Epicurus, 1994).
3.1.2 Don’t worry about death
Get used to believing that death is nothing to us since ‘all good and bad consists in
sense-experience and death is the privation of sense-experience’ (Epicurus, 1994,
p. 124). When you die, your soul ceases to exist, because it is composed of very fine
and smooth atoms that are dispersed if the body no longer holds them together, says
Epicurus in his Letter to Herodotus (Epicurus, 1994, p. 65). Therefore, when you are
dead you cannot deal with death and when you are alive you don’t have to worry
about death either since death is not yet present. There is no life after death, as
Epicurus puts it: ‘...it [death] is relevant neither to the living nor to the dead, since it
does not affect the former, and the latter do not exist’ (Epicurus, 1994, p. 125).
Epicurus chooses a rational solution to eliminate our fear of death, which is in his
eyes a great source of unhappiness.
3.1.3 What is good is easy to get
As we have seen above, Epicurus states that what is pleasurable is easy to get; it is
not difficult to achieve the state of absence of pain. Epicurus seems to have been
occupied by the fact that a lot of people are unhappy, despite the fact that their
means of living could be sufficient for a pleasurable life. The goal of his philosophy is
to carefully manage pleasures, for it is the specific way in which people try to fulfil
their needs where they go wrong (Annas, 1993, p. 199). According to Epicurus, our
desires fall into three categories: ‘...some are natural and necessary, some natural
and not necessary and some neither natural nor necessary but occurring as the result
of groundless opinion’ (Epicurus, 1994, p. xxix).
Natural and necessary desires will liberate us from pain when they are fulfilled.
We cannot be happy, healthy or even alive without these desires being fulfilled.
Epicurus mentions food, water, shelter from the elements and safety from the ani-
mals and people. According to Epicurus it is easy to provide for the fulfilment of
these basic needs yourself.
The natural desires that do not cause pain when they remain unfulfilled are not
necessary. An example is delicious and expensive food. This is pleasurable, but does
not remove pain better than ordinary food. Therefore it is natural but not necessary.
The natural and necessary desires are generic; it is the desire for food, for drink and
so on. The unnecessary and natural desires are the preferences for specific kinds of
food, such as lobster. You need to fulfil natural and necessary desires, but you can
only want specific unnecessary and natural desires, and it is better not to become
dependent on the latter, for that would increase the risk of unhappiness (Annas,
1993, p. 193). Epicurus stresses that we will be happy if we stick to the natural and
necessary desires, ‘not in order that we might make do with few things under all
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circumstances, but so that if we do not have a lot we can make do with few, being
genuinely convinced that those who least need extravagance enjoy it most’
(Epicurus, 1994, p. 130).
Unnatural and unnecessary desires are, for example, the thirst for honours and
the desire for crowns and statues. These desires limit the self-sufficiency of people
and increase the risk of unhappiness. It is better not to pursue these desires since
they will cause uncontrollable desires and moreover, the pleasures that come from
the fulfilment of unnecessary or unnatural desires, can give rise to troubles many
times greater than the pleasures. Becoming accustomed to simple ways of life makes
us completely healthy, makes us unhesitant in the face of life’s necessary duties, puts
us in better condition for the times of extravagance which sometimes come along
and make us fearless in the face of chance (Epicurus, 1994, p. 131).
3.1.4 What is terrible is easy to endure
Good is what gives us pleasure; bad is what causes us pain. According to Epicurus
these pains are always easy to ignore, since heavy pains don’t last very long and
chronic pains cause only mild distress (Epicurus, 1994, p. 4). This implies that under
all circumstances we can try to push back pains and other discomforts by focusing on
the opposite feelings of pleasure. Bodily discomfort can be outweighed by the
mental pleasure of reliving past kinetic pleasures and anticipating future ones.
3.2 More advice
The good, happy and pleasurable life Epicurus promises us when we will follow his
advice cannot be achieved without the study of philosophy. He also identifies some
virtues that contribute to our happiness, among which prudence is the most
important. He indicates friendship and justice as two important features that provide
us security which he identifies as a natural good (Epicurus, 1994, p. vii).
3.2.1 Philosophy
Philosophy should not be pursued as knowledge for its own sake, but to bring about
peace of mind and body. Philosophy helps us to eliminate the two main sources of
fear that affects our feelings of happiness negatively, our fear of death and our fear
of the gods. Besides that, Epicurus finds, as probably most philosophers do, the
activity of philosophy itself pleasurable as he puts it: ‘...in philosophy the pleasure
accompanies the knowledge. For the enjoyment does not come after the learning but
the learning and the enjoyment are simultaneous’ (Epicurus, 1994, p. 27).
3.2.2 Prudence
Epicurus’ ethics is hedonistic. As Epicurus puts it: ‘One must honour the noble, and
the virtues and things like that, if they produce pleasure. But if they do not, one must
bid them goodbye’ (Epicurus, 1994, p. 132). Virtues that do not lead to pleasure only
provide empty, pointless and disturbing expectations of rewards. But, as he puts it in
his Letter to Menoeceus, most virtues are natural adjuncts of the pleasant life and the
pleasant life is inseparable from them. Since we have to search out the reasons of
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every choice and to get rid of the opinions that are the sources of the greatest turmoil
in men’s souls, we also have to be prudent beings (Epicurus, 1994, p. 132). Therefore,
Epicurus finds prudence the most important of all virtues; without this virtue we will
not be able to decide what contributes most to our pleasure. He also considers
prudence the source of all other virtues, ‘teaching that it is impossible to live
pleasantly without living prudently, honourably, and justly and impossible to live
prudently, honourably, and justly without living pleasantly’ (Epicurus, 1994, p. 132).
We need prudence to be able to make deliberated decisions about which plea-
sures to choose or to avoid, and it is also the best weapon to fight fate, chance and
misfortune (Epicurus, 1994, pp. 129–130). The wise man knows that nothing, good or
bad with respect to living blessedly is given by chance to men. The prudent man
therefore recognizes that ‘misfortunes must be cured by a sense of gratitude for what
has been and the knowledge that what is past cannot be undone’ (Epicurus, 1994, p.
134). It also leads Epicurus to say that ‘one should envy no-one. For the good are not
worthy of envy, and the more good fortune the wicked have, the more they spoil it
for themselves’ (Epicurus, 1994, p. 53).
3.2.3 Security
In order to live an undisturbed life, Epicurus believes that we have to be safe from
our neighbours. This security is most easily provided through friendship, but also by
making laws or social contracts ‘about neither harming one another nor be harmed’,
and by withdrawal from the people since ‘the purest security is that which comes
from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many’ (Epicurus, 1994, p. xxxi).
The laws exist for the sake of the wise––the ones who follow Epicurus’ teach-
ings––not because they would commit injustice, but because they will not suffer
injustice (Clement of Alexandria and Stobaeus, cited in Epicurus, p. 103, 104).
Epicurus views justice in a hedonistic way: it should aim at our own pleasure. His
argument for obeying the law has the same signature; breaking the law will cause
disturbance since we will live with the fear of being discovered by our neighbours
(Epicurus, 1994, p. 70).
Although the fruit of justice is great, Epicurus doesn’t encourage people to be
active in public life, in business or politics or to interfere with legislation. Such
actions can bring power, but that doesn’t always bring the personal security from
others we hope to find in it. Moreover a public life puts one at a great risk for
disturbance. As Epicurus puts it: ‘The presence of wealth, honour and admiration
among the many will not produce joy or dissolve the disturbance of the soul’
(Epicurus, 1994, p. 53). Living a quiet life among like-minded friends will more likely
lead to the happy life. Public life is only a prison (Epicurus, 1994, p. 58).
3.2.4 Friendship
Friendship is of the greatest importance; it provides us with personal security. In
Epicurus’ hedonistic view, every friendship takes its origin from the benefits it
confers on us. Friends provide each other with support and assistance. Safety is
impossible without friends. Even the most self-sufficient man sometimes needs
someone to take care of him. But Epicurus also states that friendship is worth
choosing for its own sake (Epicurus, 1994, p. 23). Friendship is intrinsically valuable.
‘Of the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of one’s whole life, by far
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the greatest is the possession of friendship’ (Epicurus, 1994, p. xxvii). Although
friendship has a hedonistic starting-point, in the maturation of the friendship a friend
is no longer considered to be a means to our own happiness, but the friend has
become part of our own life, a part of our selves. We no longer only strive for our
own pleasure, we’ll also seek pleasure for our friends, and it has become a mutual
project. Epicurus takes this position to extremes: ‘The wise man feels no more pain
when he is tortured than when his friend is tortured, and will die on his behalf; for if
he betrays his friend, his entire life will be confounded and utterly upset because of a
lack of confidence’ (Epicurus, 1994, pp. 56–57).
Epicurus considers friendship the most important aspect in social life, while he
does not regard sexual relationships equally important. He says that sex hasn’t done
anyone good, and you can consider yourself lucky if intercourse does not cause any
harm (Laertius, cited in Epicurus 1994, p. 43).2
Epicurus attitude towards marriage is a subject of controversy (Brennan, 1996;
Chilton, 1960), but in general it is agreed that he preferred people not to marry,
because in marriage, as Rist (1980, pp. 127–128) put it, ‘we leave ourselves open to
troubles and inconveniences which may arise from wives and children we could
otherwise avoid. So the wise man does not marry and have children’.
Risk avoidance may have been the driving force for this attitude. Marriage and
family life implies a strong dependence on a very limited number of individuals and
loosing these bonds would inflict serious pain. Larger and more diffused forms of
community, such as in the Garden, are less dangerous. The reasoning behind this
position parallels that on food, and the dislike of dependence on specific (unnec-
essary) satisfiers (Annas, 1993, p. 197). This character of Epicurus’ philosophy seems
apparent when he states that his followers should not mourn a friend who dies before
they do, as if there was need for pity.
Note however that our interpretation is not consistent with the extreme loyalty
that Epicurus asks from good friends (Rist, 1980, p. 128). A second point to
remember is that the modern institution of marriage between two equal partners has
a lot in common with the friendship Epicurus idealized.
4 Reception
In the course of history the critics of Epicureanism have been representing Epicurus’
philosophy as a lazy-minded, shallow, pleasure-loving, immoral or godless travesty
of real philosophy (Hutchinson, 1994). His dismissal of the non-hedonistic virtues,
his retreat from politics and the idea that our soul disperses when we die, gave rise to
opposition by Christians, academic philosophers and political authorities and to the
distortion of his message. The fact that Epicurus lived and taught in a closed com-
munity, the Garden in which he was honoured as a god and in which also slaves and
women were welcomed, didn’t contribute to a clear understanding of his philosophy
either: outsiders could only guess what was going on inside and this led to many
speculations. The presence of hetaerae led to rumours and provided opponents of
Epicurus’ school with an excuse to paint the Garden as a school for scandal and
orgies (Jones, 1989, p. 19). Today the word ‘Epicureanism’ has even come to mean a
2 Some suggest that Epicurus’ negative opinion about sex is caused by an error in translation, see
Brennan (1996) for a discussion.
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life stance that implies the pursuit of sensual pleasures, a pretentious enthusiasm for
rare and expensive food and drink.
Although many of Epicurus’ contemporaries were very critical towards his hap-
piness advice, his advice on how to live a happy life must have made sense to the
people living in Hellenistic times; Epicurean communities sprang up all over the
Mediterranean world and students hardly ever left the commune for other philo-
sophical systems (Hutchinson, 1994). For many it was a workable way to come to
terms with the changing and changed world they lived in. We can also be quite
confident that his philosophy worked for Epicurus himself. As he wrote on his dying
day:
‘I write this to you while experiencing a blessedly happy day, and at the same
time the last day of my life. Urinary blockages and dysenteric discomforts
afflict me, which could not be surpassed for their intensity. But against all these
things are ranged the joy in my soul produced by the recollection of the dis-
cussions we have had’ (Laertius, cited in Epicurus 1994, p.79)
He died in a way that was consistent to his teachings about tolerance to disease,
peacefully and cheerfully (Bitsori & Galanakis, 2004).
5 Applicability of the advice today
Epicurus’ advice for leading a happy life was tailored to the situation of his time. Are
his recommendations still of use today? Below we will try to answer that question by
comparing Epicurus’ counsel with conditions for happiness observed in present day
society. For that purpose we use the large body of empirical research on life satis-
faction in western nations in the second half of the 20th century and inspect how well
these data fit Epicurus’ recommendations for a happy life. Epicurus’ concept of
happiness is compatible with the definition of happiness that is used in empirical
studies, that is, ‘subjective enjoyment of life-as-a-whole’.
5.1 Back away from society?
Epicurus tried to shelter his followers from the Hellenistic world of his times in
which the old securities were gone. He started a mini-society––the Garden––and
many of his followers lived in similar communes. The organization of the Garden
was hierarchical and Epicurus was the only one who was awarded the title ‘wise
man’. He strove to create a secure and comfortable atmosphere through friendship.
The association between members of the Garden was freer than was usual in other
schools, and members did not have to give up their private properties (Jones, 1989,
pp. 20–21). Epicurus recognized that happiness is enhanced in social conditions that
provide security and allow most autonomy/freedom (Veenhoven, 2002, p. 21).
Although living in the Garden provided a relatively safe, protected life with a full
stomach, it is another thing to say that isolating yourself in such a commune is a wise
idea. Living in a hierarchical community limits the freedom of choice for its mem-
bers, for important choices in life are already taken on the basis of the philosophical
doctrine of the commune. An example is that active political involvement in the
outside world is strongly discouraged. The commune therefore does not encourage
the members to make their own choices in life, which appears to be crucial aspects of
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the multiple-choice societies that enhance happiness (Veenhoven, 1999). To follow a
path in life that is prescribed by a leader of a commune, implies that the individual
members do not give an autonomous evaluation of all aspects of their own living
conditions. Instead, the commune makes important choices for them to assure
harmony within the commune. If all individuals would think for themselves and
pursue their own ideas of happiness, heterogeneity, disagreement and conflict would
result and the concept of the ideal, hierarchical community is threatened. This is
what Crombag and Van Dun (1997) call an ‘utopic paradox’. Happiness is the po-
sitive evaluation of one’s life as a whole, but living in a commune makes it impossible
to make this evaluation autonomous. The members cannot decide for themselves
what is best for them. One problem with this position is that it did not allow Epicurus
to pay proper attention to personality differences. For example, it is easy to imagine
that somebody high on sensation-seeking who likes to live on the edge will not be
happy with the tranquility that Epicurus envisioned in his Garden. So living con-
ditions in the Garden may have been favourable and Epicurus an enlightened ruler,
but the resulting happiness of the members lacked an essential ingredient: the
individualistic evaluation of living conditions and the freedom of choice that is based
on these individual preferences.
5.1.1 Avoid public life
Epicurus felt that politics and public life only involve needless mental stress and
should be avoided. Participation in the social life of the Garden was a substitute for
involvement in society at large. The consequence was that people became more
dependent on community life. With modern data in mind we must conclude that
Epicurus’ philosophy regarding one’s position in society, limited the options for his
followers in an unwarranted way. To be engaged in public life will certainly cause
some problems, but the net effect on happiness appears to be positive. In present day
society at least, we see a strong correlation between happiness and social involve-
ment.3 Happiness is typically higher among employed people (WDH section E 2),
among people who go out often (WDH section L 3) and among members of vol-
untary associations (WDH section S 7). The withdrawal from the many is not the
optimal choice for the majority of people.
5.1.2 Renounce fame and wealth
The desire for fame, status and wealth is unnecessary and unnatural according to
Epicurus. He stated that you had to free yourself from the prison of general edu-
cation and politics (Epicurus, 1994, p. 58). The findings gathered in the WDH show
that happiness correlates positively with social rank (WDH section S 9), education
(WDH section E 2), occupation (WDH section O 1), and social participation (WDH
sections S 6–8). Again, Epicurus’ concern with avoiding sources of possible pain
leads him to reject an important source of happiness.
An interesting aspect is Epicurus’ position on income. Epicurus is right for
modern readers that income (I 9) does not contribute much to happiness (Epicurus,
3 Since research is abundant, we will not cite all the studies separately. Instead, we will note the
section on correlational findings in the World Database of Happiness (WDH) where these data can
be found (Veenhoven, 2006).
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1994, p. 67), and modern people value happiness far above wealth (Diener, Suh,
Lucas, & Smith, 1999). But it is questionable if Epicurus was also right for his
contemporaries. Income is a powerful predictor of happiness in developing countries
(Veenhoven, 2002). One can only speculate about the significance of income in
classical Greece, but it would not be a great surprise if more income would be of
importance in those days in which economic development was not comparable to
that of modern industrial nations.
5.2 Focus on friends
Not only the quality of society matters; also the position one has in a society is of
influence on happiness. Intimate personal relationships with a partner and friends
are strongly correlated with happiness (e.g. Headey & Wearing, 1992). The many
findings on these matters are gathered in the WDH, sections M 1–4 (marriage), F 1–3
(family), F 6 (friends). Epicurus recognized how important personal relations are.
He valued affective relationships very much, and in particular friendships.
‘Friendship dances around the world announcing to all of us that we must wake
up to blessedness’ (Epicurus, 1994, p. 52).
Epicurus valued friendship above marital relationship. Note, however, that Epicurus
may have had a higher opinion of marriage as it is in the modern age, because
partner relationships nowadays are more often based on the friendship between
equals.
The existing data suggest that marriage is more important than friendship for
modern readers. The correlations between happiness and being married (M 2) tend
to be stronger than the correlations between happiness and contacts with friends (F
6). Likewise, married women without a close friend were found to be happier than
unmarried people with a close friend (Ventegodt, 1996, p. 170). One can conclude
that Epicurus may have placed too much emphasis on generic friendship and at the
expense of specific marital ties.
The data indicate that happiness is served by specificity in social bonding. Kamp
Dush and Amato (2005) describe in a large sample of Americans under the age of
55, that on average married people are happier than cohabiting people, cohabiting
people are happier than the ones that are steady dating, steady dating people are
happier than multiple daters, and the multiple daters are happier than the non-
daters. However, this does not mean that Epicurus is not right. His point is that the
disadvantages of marriage are greater than the satisfactions. In modern terms this
implies that it is too risky to be dependent on specific desires (a spouse), because of
the pain that marital conflict, divorce or widowhood would bring. We have already
seen that the married are happier than unmarried, so they can live with average
marital conflict, but we should also weigh the yields of marriage against the costs of
divorce and widowhood. We will do that in a paragraph below.
5.3 Healthy living
Epicurus regarded health of the body as one of the most important determinants of
happiness, but he placed even more emphasis on the health of the soul. When the
mind is free of disturbance then the pains of the body are endurable, and do not have
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to affect our happiness. We can learn to push back pains and discomfort through
mental pleasures.
Epicurus’ remarks about this subject fit modern findings on the relationship be-
tween happiness and health. Health is strongly related to happiness, in particular
self-rated health. ‘The impact of health on happiness depends for a great part on the
individual’s perception of the situation’ (Diener et al., 1999, p. 287). This links up
with the finding that happiness is more strongly related to mental health than to
physical health (WDH Sections M 7 and P 6). Or, as Epicurus would have put it, a
mind free of disturbance would not only enhance physical health, but would also
help to deal with the hardships of sickness. We can still be happy when our physical
condition is not good.
5.4 A detached stance to life
The above-mentioned findings give an impression of the strengths and the weak-
nesses for present day conditions of Epicurus’ advice. Still, it can be argued that this
is not the essential part of his happiness advice. His central idea is that one should
not seek happiness in specific living conditions, but that one should be able to
achieve happiness regardless of external conditions. He stimulates internal coping.
To evaluate this position, we will consider it in the light of modern psychology.
Happiness is the Chief Good in Epicurus’ philosophy, but it is important to note
that he does not value positive affect all that much. Happiness is conceived as
absence of pain, but even the pain is not that important, because he states that the
severest pains are easy to endure. Epicurus’ hedonism has strong stoic or ascetic
tendencies. Parducci (1995, pp. 17–18) comments: Epicurus’ ‘position was to estab-
lish an ascetic detachment from material conditions so as to minimize the pain of
their loss. Although Epicurus claimed that a man could be happy even in a rack, it is
not clear that he believed genuine happiness to be possible’.
The position of Epicurus is difficult to judge, because of the seeming inconsistency
of his remarks that pleasure is the same as the absence of pain and the idea that pain
is easy to bear. Our interpretation is that Epicurus placed pleasure and pain on a
continuum and that a person can experience either positive or negative affect.
However he also recognized that people reflect on their affective experience and
that this meta-appraisal can make a difference. This interpretation makes it possible
to highlight several strengths and weaknesses of his happiness advice.
Epicurus was probably wrong with his idea about the continuum of positive and
negative affect. Pleasure and pain are registered independently from each other in our
brains (e.g. Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). Pain relief and the escape from expected pain
leads to positive affect (e.g. Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1991), but continuous absence of
pain does not necessarily lead to happy tranquillity, but can also be boring. Headey and
Wearing (1992) describe the fact that a significant minority of people have low levels of
psychological distress and are unhappy at the same time. Csikszentmihaly (1999) states
that happiness results from optimal functioning that can be found between boredom
and anxiety. These findings contradict Epicurus’ notion of happiness as mere absence
of pain. Epicurus’ happiness advice does not cater for exhilarating aspects of a business
man’s life that involves risks and losses but also makes one live to the full and be happy
on balance. He also did not think of anhedonia, the inability to experience emotion,
that is characteristic of people with a depressive disorder. This condition is often more
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difficult to bear than emotional pain itself. Happiness is definitely something other
than the mere absence of all pain (Bergsma, 1995).
Headey and Wearing (1992, pp. 4–8) also notice that some people are happy
despite the fact that they experience high levels of psychological distress. People
often perceive life as both quite satisfying and quite stressful. This goes against
Epicurus’ idea that happiness can be equated with absence of pain. Still, the com-
bination of high distress with happiness can be reconciled with Epicurus’ philosophy,
because of his idea that we can learn to tolerate pain.
The independence of positive and negative affect has two consequences for
Epicurus’ position. His notion that avoiding pain is sufficient for establishing a good
quality of life may be too conservative. The second consequence is that he neglected
the role of positive affect. We start with a discussion of his ideas to avoid pain.
5.5 Avoid pain and greed
Epicurus’ idea that we should not want too much is a consequence of his tendency to
avoid the risk of pain. Strong desires can make us miserable if we have to live
without the objects of our desires. Epicurus’ idea not to indulge seems to be fruitful.
Csikszentmihaly (1999) praises Epicurus because his philosophy encourages people
to defer gratifications. Epicurus claimed that all pain was evil, but that we should not
avoid pain, when this saves us more pain in the long run. The same is true for
pleasures. All pleasures are good, but we should not indulge if the pleasures harm us
in the long run.
Moderation in pleasures turns out to be successful in terms of happiness. Headey
and Wearing (1992, pp. 92–93) show that such a pleasure-hunting lifestyle fails in the
long run. The purely hedonistic way of life often means that people fail to maintain
intimate relationships, whereas such relationships form a great source of happiness.
The question is whether Epicurus emphasized deferring gratifications too much.
He favoured a serene life with the motto: ‘‘If a little is not enough for you, nothing
is.’’ There are three ways to evaluate this position. The first is a discussion of the
limits of willpower, the second focuses on the optimal level of openness to plea-
surable experiences and the third is a discussion of the merits of modest aspirations.
We start with willpower.
5.5.1 Can we restrain?
Self-regulation can be thought of as the internal resource that is used by the self to
make decisions, respond actively, and exert self-control. Epicurus’ philosophy of the
good life requires that one should not spontaneously indulge in pleasures, but always
ask what the consequences are in the long run. If I will enjoy this excellent food, how
big is the danger that I will get frustrated if I would have to do without it later?
Following Epicurus seems to require a lot of self-regulation and it has become clear
that willpower is a limited resource (e.g. Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004).
5.5.2 How much enjoyment is too much?
This theoretical point can be explained by results from happiness research. Hedo-
nism is the way of life in which pleasure plays an important role, and as we noted
above, it is possible to take this position to the extreme. A drug addict whose life
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deteriorates in the hunt for another pleasurable shot can serve as an example in this
respect. But does this mean that we should curtail our pleasures to the limit that is
necessary for our survival? The question has not had a lot of attention in research,
but Veenhoven (2003) presents data that suggest that a ‘heavy dose of pleasure’ does
not limit happiness or longevity in the long run. Having sex frequently and valuing
free time show a linear positive correlation with happiness, and the use of stimulants
an inverted U-curve. Peterson, Park, and Seligman (2005) describe the fact that an
orientation toward pleasure makes a (small) contribution to well-being, without
harming the quest for meaning or engagement in life.
Perhaps these results indicate that we should use our resources for self-regulation
especially if it comes to big issues in life, and we should not value pleasure over
finding meaning and engagement. We waste our resources by focussing on minor
points like limiting innocent pleasures.
5.5.3 Can we want too much?
Epicurus claims that high aspirations are a threat to happiness, because of the risk of
‘unnecessary’ frustration. Several modern psychologists agree, and lowering aspi-
rations and expectations is a part of the program that Fordyce (1977, 1983) has
developed to increase personal happiness. Yet empirical studies do not show that
happy people want less than the unhappy. To the contrary, happy people set typi-
cally higher aspirations and expect more positive outcomes (WDH section L 7). This
has several reasons: one is that wants keep us going and that fully functioning makes
us feel happy. Wanting nothing often means doing nothing. Another reason is that
happiness works as a go-signal and stimulates us to reach out and achieve things
(Fredrickson, 1998, 2001).
5.6 The role of positive affect
Though there is certainly a point in moderation, Epicurus has overstated that case.
Possibly he did so in his role as a teacher. Exaggerating the dangers of hedonism may
be the best way to counter possible side effects. But the idea that Epicurus made a
mistake for educational purposes does not seem to be the whole story. The way
Epicurus thought about happiness as the opposite of pain, made him think too easily
about positive affect. It was something that would happen to you more or less
automatically if you were in the right frame of mind. He cognitively explained away
the fears for the gods and death and added: ‘what is good is easy to get.’ This is why
Epicurus advises readers to be too passive in their pursuit of happiness. Annas (1993,
p. 198) puts it like this: ‘Epicurean happiness is bought at the price of adjusting the
agent too thoroughly to the world, that is too passive a conception of human life.’ In
contemporary life data suggest that happiness is better served with active involve-
ment in society. We not only want a mind that is free of disturbance, but we also
have the possibility to try to control the interaction with the environment so that we
can change our (view of the) world so that it better suits our preferences.
Fredrickson’s (1998, 2001) ‘broaden-and-build’ theory of positive affect gives a
theoretical underpinning of this idea. Her first key position is that positive affect
broadens the individual’s momentary mindset, and she urges one to play, explore and
to integrate in social networks. These activities build the resources of the individual
for they lead to the discovery of novel and creative ideas and stronger social bonds.
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The importance of positive affect is underlined in several empirical studies and
analyse. Positive affect stimulates health and longevity (Danner,Snowdon,& Friesen,
2001; Pressman & Cohen, 2005), finding meaning in life (King, Hicks, Krull, & Del
Gaiso, 2006), taking advantage of unforeseen opportunities (Carver, 2003) and also
leads to success. Positive affect promotes sociability and activity, altruism, liking of
self and others, effective conflict resolution skills and perhaps original thinking
(Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). It is a serious omission that Epicurus neglects
the constructive aspects of positive affect. Happiness is better served by a full life
with pleasure, meaning and engagement (Peterson et al., 2005), than with an empty
life that focuses primarily on avoiding pain.
5.7 Acquiescence
There is one aspect of the ‘four basic truths’ that escapes the analysis in the para-
graphs above. The statement that ‘what is terrible is easy to endure’ adds a
dimension to Epicurus philosophy, that fits in with the spiritual tradition that places
greater emphasis not on an emotional high, but on a state of peace, tranquillity and
understanding (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Epicurus four-part cure has three remarks on
coping with pain (fear of Gods, death and terrible pain) and all three boil down to
the idea that it is not necessary to lose emotional equilibrium over these stressors.
Above we have noted that Epicurus does not stimulate people enough to actively
pursue happiness, but it is another matter when he offers wisdom in dealing with
hardships.
The first thing to notice is that Epicurus’ advice focuses on the hardest parts of
existence. Death, disease, terrible pain, the impossibility of changing the past and ill
fate (the gods) are mentioned explicitly. These stressors have in common that they
are unchangeable. Efforts to change the event itself will only yield frustration and
desperation. Persons have to find a way to cope with this difficult psychological
content. The direct approach to this is to try to change the frequency or intensity of
these difficult thoughts and feelings. There are certainly occasions where this works.
Abbe, Tkach, and Lyubomirsky (2003) claim that dispositionally happy persons use
distraction successfully in dealing with problems. But sometimes the attempts to
escape make things worse. For example, avoidance seems to be at the heart of
several forms of anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorders (Abueg, Follette, &
Ruzek, 2001). The efforts to change one’s negative feelings can make them stronger
(Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).
5.7.1 Coping with pain
How can we tell the difference between emotion regulation processes that reduce or
increase the impact of negative experiences? There have been several attempts to
understand this difference (e.g. Gross, 1998a, b). A useful distinction in this respect
is the difference between suppression of negative emotional content and reappraisal
of the situation. The first tactic increases negative emotion and decreases happiness.
Reappraisal has the opposite results (Gross & John, 2003). Epicurus makes the right
choice between the two. He reappraises fear of the gods and fear of death in a way as
to suggest that they are no longer relevant for our emotional well-being, but he does
not suppress these fears for he lets them take the centre stage in his philosophy.
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Another question is if Epicurus’ reappraisals are strong enough to make a mean-
ingful difference for emotional reactions.
The idea that pain is easy to endure cannot simply be classified as a form of
suppression or reappraisal. It is a second-order change, a change on the meta level
(Hayes, 2001). The central idea behind Epicurus’ remarks seems to be that people
can allow themselves to feel the pain for it is quite possible to endure it without
being too much disturbed by it. This interpretation requires some goodwill and
reading between the lines, but if it is correct, then it is reasonable to expect that
reading Epicurus can make it easier to deal with the pain. Calm acceptance of
mental content, as is encouraged by diverse schools of thought behind Buddhism,
psychoanalytic free association and systematic desensitization, seems to be a helpful
thing to do. Empirical evidence suggests that it helps in dealing with a wide range of
psychological disorders (Hayes, Folette, & Linehan, 2004), physical pain and a
variety of well-being outcomes (Kabat-Zinn, 2000). One of the positive aspects of
acceptance is that it helps with the experience of negative psychological content,
without a need to act or ruminate if the situation is unchangeable. This makes it
possible to deal with hardship without making things worse by avoidance, negative
thoughts about the self or counterproductive action. For example, accepting that you
feel bad because you crave for alcohol, can actually prevent relapse to binge
drinking. The paradox is that people can regain control over their lives if they
discontinue their efforts to get a better grip.
5.7.2 Mindfulness
If we take this reasoning one step further, we can link the concept of ‘enduring pain’
also with well-being outside the realm of clinical populations. Brown and Ryan
(2003) investigated the effects of mindfulness, a concept that is closely related to
acquiescence, but adds the dimensions of willingly taking in positive and negative
psychological content. Mindfulness requires a more active and alert attitude than
mere acceptance. Ryan and Brown (2003, p. 822) quote two different descriptions of
mindfulness: ‘the clear and single-minded awareness of what actually happens to us
and in us at successive moments of perception’ and ‘keepings one’s consciousness
alive to the present reality’.
Being mindful correlates positively with life satisfaction, vitality, autonomy,
competence and positive affect and negatively with negative affect, reported physical
symptoms, depression, anxiety and impulsiveness. Experimental manipulation to
enhance mindfulness also yielded positive results (Brown & Ryan, 2003).
Mindfulness skills are gaining attention from psychotherapists, because they can
be of help for clients who have to overcome adversity. The Journal Clinical Psy-
chology: Science and Practice devoted a special issue to mindfulness in 2003. Bear
(2003) states:
The empirical literature on the effects of mindfulness training contains many
methodological weaknesses, but it suggests that mindfulness interventions may lead
to reductions in a variety of problematic conditions, including pain, stress, anxiety,
depressive relapse, and disordered eating.
Mindfulness can be a positive factor in life and Epicurus seemed to have realized
this in his ideas about enduring pain and living deliberately and prudently, without
the need to act on the feelings of the moment. Epicurus’ philosophy is worthwhile
in dealing with hardship and pain, although it requires some active interpretation of
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his texts to use them constructively. Paradoxically, Epicurus underestimated the
tolerance people have for minor pains, for he advised them to shy away from
involvement in society as a means of pain reduction, ignoring the fact that the
positive experiences linked with involvement can offer enough compensation for
the hassles.
The combination of acceptance with passivity and moderation in the hunt for
pleasurable experiences also implies a danger. Scheier, Carver, and Bridges (2001)
suggest that the line between stoic resignation and acceptance is not always clear and
that the resignation has adverse consequences. Acceptance seems to be a healthy
alternative, if it brings somebody to abandon goals that are no longer within reach
and to engage in the pursuit of alternative goals that still are possible. If somebody
with a deadly disease abandons all hope and accepts the inevitable, this seems to
shorten the lifespan. A healthier alternative is if one decides what can still be done
with the time left, for example spend more time with family. Acceptance is harmful
when it implies stoic ‘goallessness’.
6 Does refraining from marriage pay off?
6.1 An empirical test
Annas (1993) describes Epicurus’ philosophy as being risk aversive. It is better to
avoid pain than to indulge in pleasures. In the paragraphs above we concluded on
the basis of a mixture of theoretical and empirical arguments that this position is too
strict. Still this exercise is not completely convincing from an Epicurean point of
view, for the philosopher does not argue that plain bread is just as tasty as lobster,
but that the preference for lobster causes problems if one becomes dependent on it,
in that life might take such a turn that a person has to live without it. In a similar
vein, he argues that marriage may involve pleasures, but that these are not sufficient
to compensate for the inconveniences. For a modern reader the inconveniences
would translate as marital conflict, divorce or widowhood. In other words, it is in
Epicurus’ view that the lifetime benefits of marriage do not weight up against its
costs and one can better abstain from marriage. In this section we will check whether
this claim applies today. It is established that married people are typically happier
than the unmarried4 but that among the unmarried the never married are happier
than previously married but divorced or widowed people (e.g. Glenn & Weaver,
1988; Peters & Liefbroer, 1997; Waite, 1995). Clark and Oswald (2002) translated the
experience of life-events relating to partnerships into a monetary ‘compensation
amount’. In their calculation, marriage has a happiness value of £70.000 a year, and
widowhood could be compensated with a monetary sum of £170,000 a year. In other
words, you have to stay married for 3 years to compensate for 1 year of widowhood.
Evidently, those figures are biased because they are derived from reactions to life
changes, and it is known that people have amazing ability to adjust to adverse
circumstances and that happiness tends to return to baseline level in time (e.g.
Headey & Wearing, 1992; Suh, Diener, & Fujita, 1996).
Following Epicurus warnings we should consider the number of years that people
spend in each type of marital status. If people who marry are likely to spend a long
4 We use the term ‘married’ for all people living together in a relationship with a partner.
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period of life divorced or widowed, this could have a substantial effect on their
overall happiness. In order to evaluate this issue we use the concept of ‘happy life
years’ (HLY), as introduced by Veenhoven (1996). This concept is defined as the
number of happy years a person is expected to live. It is calculated by multiplying the
number of years a person is expected to live by a happiness weight factor for each of
these years. This weight factor will vary with the marital status. Mathematically, this
could be expressed as
HLY =
X
Yp*Hp,
where HLY is the number of Happy Life Years, P is a vector of possible states that a
person can occupy, Yp is the number of years a person lives in state P, and Hp is the
happiness weight factor attached to state P.
6.2 Method
In order to estimate the number of HLY over the life time, decisions have to be
taken on (a) the number of positions P that should be distinguished, (b) the number
of years people spend in each of these positions, and (c) the calculation of the
happiness weights that are attached to each of the positions. We will discuss each of
these three issues in turn.
Most research on the relationship between happiness and marital status compares
the happiness of married people with those of the never married, divorced and
widowed. This does not take into account the increasing complexity of partner
relationships. As a result of the increasing popularity of unmarried cohabitation,
living apart together, divorce, and remarriage, people often occupy a diversity of
positions during their life course. Since we are not able to take all this potential
complexity into account, we make a distinction between five possible marital sta-
tuses: (a) never married, (b) first marriage, (c) divorced or separated, (d) remarried
(e) widowed. We do not differentiate formal and informal marriage. The latter
phenomenon has gained popularity in many Western countries during the last few
decades and the relation with happiness is similar (Peters & Liefbroer, 1997). The
second thing to notice is that we make a distinction between people in their first
‘marriage’ and people in their ‘second marriage’. This is done because well-being in
a second marriage is often lower than in a first marriage (Kurdek, 1990; Peters &
Liefbroer, 1997). The next question is then what part of their lives people spend in
each of these five states. In our opinion, it does not make sense to calculate this for
the ‘average’ person. Rather, one would want to describe different marital careers.
In Table 1, we present six common marital careers in present day Dutch society. The
Table 1 Overview of different types of life courses
Type Sequence of events
I Never married––death
II Married––death
III Married––widowhood––death
IV Married––divorce––death
V Married––divorce––remarriage––death
VI Married––divorce––remarriage––widowhood––death
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first life course type is that of the never married and exemplifies the advice of
Epicurus to shun marriage. Life course types II and III are typical for people who
marry and do not divorce. For half of the partners these unions will be dissolved by
the death of the spouse. Life course types IV, V, and VI exemplify the varied
experiences of people who experience divorce or separation. Some will not remarry
(type IV), some will remarry and live with their new partner until death (type V) and
some will remarry and experience the death of their second spouse (type VI).
Evidently, some life courses will be more complicated than the six we have outlined
here. However, these will only constitute a very small minority of all life courses.
For each of these six life course types one would like to know at what average age
transitions between marital statuses occur and what proportion of the population
experience each of the six life courses. This is problematic given that life courses
differ strongly between cohorts. Here, we try to solve this issue by constructing
synthetic life courses (Willekens, 1999). Based on period-specific information, we
estimate how life courses would evolve if the occurrence and timing of partner-
related events that is observed in recent years would continue into the future. We
made estimates based on two sources: officially published data of Statistics Neth-
erlands, and survey data from the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study (NKPS)
(Dykstra et al., 2005). In the first wave of the NKPS, information on life courses was
collected from more than 8,000 persons, forming a representative sample of the
Dutch population of age 15 and over. In Table 2, estimates of the average ages at
which specific transitions occur are presented, whereas in Table 3 the distribution of
Table 3 Distribution of the Dutch population by life course type and sex (in percentage of the total
male and female population)
Type Sequence of events Man Woman
I Never married––death 6 6
II Married––death 48 20
III Married––widowed––death 21 47
IV Married––divorced––death 10 12
V Married––divorced––remarried––death 9 3
VI Married––divorced––remarried––widowed––death 3 9
Table 2 Average age for different transitions in partner status, by sex
Event Average age man Average age woman
First marriage 26 23
Divorce 35 32
(After 9 years of marriage) (After 9 years of marriage)
Remarriage 38 36
(3 years after divorce) (4 years after divorce)
Widowhood 71 69
Death of never married individual 74 80
Death of married individual 78 82
Death of widowed individual 76 81
Death of divorced individual 75 80
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the population across the six life course types is presented.5 Given that the ages at
which men and women experience family-related life events differ quite substan-
tially, these calculations are performed separately for men and women.
The final issue concerns the estimation of the happiness weights that need to be
attached to each partner status position. To estimate these weights we used an
abridged version of the Bradburn Affect Balance Scale that has been used in the
NKSP. This version contains five items: three about negative affect and two about
positive affect (Dykstra et al., 2005). We considered the questions about positive
affect (feeling happy and composed and calm) and negative affect (feeling nervous,
depressed and miserable and dejected) to be equally important. Therefore we used
the answer to the question about happiness twice. We added the three positive
scores and subtracted the negative ones and translated this score to a scale of zero to
one.6 Table 4 presents the average happiness scores for each marital status position.
These scores are in line with results from earlier research. Happiness scores are
highest for those in their first marriage, followed by the remarried. Scores are sub-
stantially lower for the never married, the divorced and the widowed. In addition,
happiness is lower among women. This is particularly true for happiness among
married and remarried women, mirroring the fact that the gains from marriage are
smaller for women than for men.
6.3 Results
Using the information from Tables 2 and 4, the number of HLY from age 18
onwards was calculated for each life course type. In Table 5 the results from this
calculation are presented, again separately for men and women. From Table 5, it is
clear that the preferable life course in terms of the number of HLY is to live with
one spouse until death. Compared to people who never lived with a partner, the
difference in HLY is more than six years for men and more than 4 years for women.
This result clearly contradicts Epicurus’ advice that it is best to refrain from marriage
altogether. At the same time, Epicurus is right that marital break-up, either by
divorce or widowhood leads to a reduction in HLY. Still, for all people who expe-
rienced marital break-up (Types III to VI), the number of HLY is at least equal to
that of the never married. Only among people who experience a divorce and do not
remarry, is HLY about equal to the HLY of the never married. From these results, it
Table 4 Average Happiness score (scale 0–1) according to partner status and sex
Partner status Men Women
Never married 0.72 0.70
Married 0.79 0.75
Divorced 0.70 0.69
Remarried 0.76 0.72
Widowed 0.72 0.70
5 These figures do not add up to 100%, as a small proportion of people in the Netherlands expe-
rience life courses with multiple union formations and dissolutions. Their numbers are too small and
their life courses too varied to allow further analysis.
6 We also used an alternative method in which we constructed a Likert-scale based on the five items.
The results hardly differed from the ones presented here.
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seems safe to conclude that Epicurus’ skepticism about marriage is not warranted. In
present day society at least, the gains in happiness are greater than the costs. The
desire for a partner cannot be classified as ‘natural and unnecessary’.
In addition, comparing the HLY of men and women allow some interesting
observations. First of all, it can be noted that the HLY of each life course type is
higher for women than for men. This suggests that the higher life expectancy of
women compensates for the lower level of happiness per year. Although women are
less happy than men in almost every partner status, the final HLY are higher because
they live longer than men. Second, the HLY of men and women following the most
common life course type (type II for men and type III for women) hardly differ at
all. In that sense, it seems that the lifetime happiness of men and women following
the modal life course for their sex is more or less the same. Third, the difference in
HLY between types I and II is smaller for women than for men. This results from
two facts: women gain less happiness from marriage than men and the difference in
life expectancy between the never married and the married is smaller for women
than for men. Still, even women seem well advised not to pay too much attention to
the teachings of Epicurus regarding family life.
6.4 Limitations
Finally, we would like to point out some of the limitations of this empirical exercise.
A first limitation is that we did not differentiate happiness within partner statuses,
for instance by age or by duration since the start of the status. It seems unlikely,
however, that refining the analysis in this respect would yield results that are sub-
stantially different from the ones presented here.7
Another limitation is that we constructed synthetic life courses. It does not reflect
the life course of specific cohorts, but rather assumes that patterns observed in the
present time will hold for the future as well. Evidently, that will not necessarily be
true. For instance, it might well be that the proportion of marriages ending in divorce
will increase. If so, more people will follow life course types IV, V and VI, shifting
the HLY of the total population downwards. A third issue relates to selection and
causality. For example, it is reasonable to expect that selection processes partly
determine who will get married and who will stay single all of their lives. Some of the
people who stay unmarried may be selective on characteristics that increase the
Table 5 Number of HLY after age 18, by life course type and sex
Type Sequence of events Men Women
I Never married––death 40.1 43.1
II First marriage––death 46.6 47.8
III Married––widowed––death 44.7 46.4
IV Married––divorced––death 40.9 43.2
V Married––divorced––remarried––death 45.4 46.0
VI Married––divorced––remarried––widowed––death 43.9 45.0
7 We checked this by applying a model in which the happiness weights for each partner status were
allowed to vary by age, if a regression model showed that happiness for that partner status varied
significantly by age. The results from this more complicated model differed little from the ones
presented in Table 5.
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chances of unhappiness. If so, the impact of life events on HLY is overestimated.
However, research has shown that marriage has a substantial protective effect,
suggesting that even after controlling for selection, some differences in HLY
between life course types would remain (Brockmann & Klein, 2004; Lillard & Waite,
1995).
A final limitation is that the analysis is about the average person. For specific
individuals the costs of marriage may exceed the benefits, as seems to be the case in
low quality marriages (Hawking & Booth, 2005). These limitations notwithstanding,
we believe that the analyses presented give added weight to our conclusion that
Epicurus too rigidly advised people to be passive in life, for all he wanted them to do
is to avoid pain. Sometimes it is better to go for specific pleasures as well.
7 Discussion
Epicurus showed a lot of confidence in his happiness advice. At the end of his Letter
to Menoeceus he wrote: ‘Practise these and the related precepts day and night, by
yourself and with a like-minded friend, and you will never be disturbed either when
awake or in sleep, and you will live as a god among men.’ A more ambivalent picture
arises from our assessment of the applicability of his happiness advice today.
7.1 Recommendations that apply today
It is positive that Epicurus mentions the importance of the bio-psychological needs
of people, and that fulfilling these needs will contribute greatly to happiness. Also his
observation that intimate relationships, and especially friendships enhance happiness
more than materialism and status, stands the test of modern data. His advice to live a
life with moderate and varied pleasures turns out to be valid, although he exag-
gerated the need for deferring gratification. His ideas about the importance of a
healthy lifestyle seem to be correct as well. In these respects it won’t do us any harm
to follow his advice today.
7.2 Recommendations that don’t apply today
However, there are two noticeable exceptions. Research findings do not support his
advice to prefer friendship to marriage and to avoid public life. For this he offered
the alternative of living in a commune of like-minded people. For his contempo-
raries this may have been enough compensation, given the societal turmoil of his
time, but this way of life is not appropriate for present-day readers.
7.3 Unnecessary unhappiness
The value of Epicurus’ advice, however, is not that he pointed to a unique direction
that would always make people happy. The central aim of his philosophy is find a
cure for ‘unnecessary’ unhappiness, that is the low well-being of people that have
their basic needs fulfilled, but who still feel bad because they want things they cannot
have. This advice shares many characteristics with modern day cognitive behavioral
therapy that aims to cure counterproductive patterns of thinking and reacting and to
replace them by more realistic and helpful ones.
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In Epicurus’ happiness advice a lot of attention is given to the unchangeable
stressors of life, such as death, disease, terrible pain and ill fate (the gods). He
encourages his followers to confront these facts of life, without losing emotional
equilibrium. The core of the self does not need to be touched by the hardships. We
do not know how effective this approach is for the readers of his texts, but research
about acceptance (Hayes, 2001) indicates that this may be a fruitful approach for
dealing with difficult emotions.
However, Epicurus’ focus on avoiding negative affect has two serious side effects
if it is used as inspiration for dealing with life. The first is that Epicurus––for a
hedonist––had a surprisingly negative view of positive affect. He conceived happi-
ness as the absence of pain and this implied that there was little need to pursue
positive experiences. Escaping pain was enough. This runs counter to what is known
today about the active lifestyle of happy persons and about the independence of
positive and negative affect. For the art of life, you need positive goals as well.
Epicurus’ ideas about friendship and marriage can serve as an example in this
respect. Epicurus advised people to focus on a wide circle of friends, and not on a
specific bond with one spouse. The idea was that it is too dangerous to become
dependent on one person, because of the pains of bad marriage, divorce or wid-
owhood. With the help of a large Dutch survey study we were able to show that this
risk avoidance is unwarranted. On average the number of HLY is greater for those
that take the risk and became involved in family life. The same can be argued for
involvement in public life. On average the yields of involvements more than com-
pensate for the frustrations.
One additional omission that has to be noted is that Epicurus neglected per-
sonality differences. Personality is one of the strongest and most consistent predic-
tors of subjective well-being (e.g. Diener et al., 1999). The happy individual is
extravert, optimistic, and worry-free, has internal control, self-esteem and feels in
control of his environment. Epicurus’ happiness advice does not take personality
into account. This might have been because he underestimated the importance of
personality traits. Another reason may be that he focused on aspects his followers
were able to change. His advice was aimed at overcoming one’s fears and being in
control of one’s own life. A last possible reason may be that personality differences
would have had repercussions for his commune in the Garden. It is easier to be an
enlightened leader, if you do not have to fuss about personal preferences in life-style.
7.4 Limitations to this approach
The present study has several limitations. The first is that Epicurus’ advice was
aimed at his contemporaries, but we investigated the applicability for modern
readers. Some of Epicurus ‘mistakes’ may have been caused by this transition. The
second is that we used findings from general population surveys to judge the
applicability of the advice. A better approach would be to empirically test if present
day readers would actually benefit from reading Epicurus. A third limitation is that
our judgment is based on our interpretation of Epicurus’philosophy, for which we
often followed the lead of Annas (1993). It is an open question whether the average
modern reader of Epicurus reads his admonitions in the same way. This question can
only be answered by an empirical study and such a study would be worth under-
taking, the philosophy of the good life being too important to leave it to intellectual
speculation.
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